

**ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION
GUIDELINE
FOR
REAL ESTATE AGENTS AND
BROKERS**

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ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

Background

The global threats of money laundering, and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have led the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) to strengthen Guyana's AML/CFT/CPF regime in support of the efforts of Government of Guyana to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. Effective enforcement of policies to deter money laundering, and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, should, inter alia, enhance the integrity of the financial system and reduce incentives for the commission of crime within the jurisdiction.

The threats of money laundering and the financing of terrorism extend beyond the traditional financial entities which have been receiving attention for control of these activities. It is therefore necessary for certain Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professionals to be regulated so as to keep them safe from these nefarious activities, and to protect the legitimate financial system from illegitimately acquired funds that could find their way into the financial system via these non-financial entities.

The reporting entities in the **Fourth Schedule of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 as amended (AMLCFT Act 2009)** include Real Estate Agents, Brokers, Dealers, Valuers and Housing Developers.¹ The activity of *'dealing in real estate when the person dealing is involved in transactions for their client concerning the buying and selling of real estate'* is subject to the AMLCFT Act.

According to Section 2 and the First Schedule of the AMLCFT Act, the Supervisory Authority appointed for Real Estate Agents, Brokers, Dealers, Valuers and Housing Developers is the

¹ The interpretation as expressed by the Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023 in the Second Schedule amended the AMLCFT Act Fourth Schedule to include the following interpretation: Real Estate Agents, Brokers, Dealers, Valuers and Housing Developers, include any person registered or licensed under the Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act, 2023 to engage in real estate business.

Guyana Real Estate Agents Authority as established under section 21 of the Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023.

The activity of *'dealing in real estate when the person dealing are involved in transactions for their client concerning the buying and selling of real estate'* is subject to the AMLCFT Act as a reporting entity. Further, the Supervisory Authority for Real Estate agents, Brokers, Dealers, Valuers and Housing Developers is the Real Estate Authority as established by section 21 of the Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023.

Section 23(2)(b) of the AMLCFT Act empowers the Guyana Real Estate Authority, as a supervisory authority, to issue instructions, guidelines or recommendations and provide training to reporting entities on their obligations and requirements under the Act and to make the reporting entities aware of any amendments to the laws relating to money laundering, terrorist financing or proceeds of crime.

Further, Section 24 of the **Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023** provides that the Authority shall be responsible for, inter alia, *'issuing guidelines and codes of practice for real estate agents, and brokers from time to time'*.

The essential ingredient in an effective anti-money laundering system is an effective know your customer due diligence system. Everything in this Guideline is founded on this understanding and is aimed at equipping users of it to apply such measures in their business affairs.

Purpose of Guideline

The purpose of this Guideline is to provide guidance to all Real Estate Agents, on how they can fulfil their obligations in relation to the AMLCFT Act 2009 and in doing so comply with the AMLCFT requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations. This guideline should be read in conjunction with the AMLCFT Act and Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023.

APPLICATION

This Guideline applies to all persons and entities operating in the real estate industry, whether as business owners, as sole real estate agents or in any related activity. It is expected to be followed by Real estate companies and their agents pursuant to the Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023.

Where Guyanese businesses have branches or subsidiaries overseas, steps should be taken to alert the management of such overseas branches to the requirements in Guyana in relation to Anti-

Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing. The requirements of the AMLCFT Act apply to an independent real estate agent as they do to a firm, partnership or corporate arrangement.

MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM

Money Laundering

Money laundering has been defined as the act or attempted act to disguise the source of money or assets derived from criminal activity. It is the effort to transform “dirty” money, into “clean” money.

The money laundering process often involves:

- (i) placement of the proceeds of crime into the financial system, sometimes by techniques such as structuring currency deposits in amounts to evade reporting requirements or co-mingling currency deposits of legal and illegal enterprises;
- (ii) The layering of these proceeds by moving them around the financial system, often in a complex series of transactions to create confusion and complicate the paper trail; and
- (iii) Integrating the funds into the financial and business system so that they appear as legitimate funds or assets.

Financing of Terrorism

Terrorism is the act of seeking for political, religious or ideological reasons to intimidate or compel others to act in a specified manner. A successful terrorist group, much like a criminal organization, is generally able to obtain sources of funding and develop means of obscuring the links between those sources and the uses of the funds. While the sums needed are not always large and the associated transactions are not necessarily complex, terrorists need to ensure that funds are available to purchase the goods or services needed to commit terrorist acts. In some cases, persons accused of terrorism may commit crimes to finance their **activities and hence transactions related to terrorist financing may resemble money laundering.**

It is worth emphasizing that while money laundering is concerned with funds generated from unlawful sources, funds used for terrorist activities are often legitimate in nature. The source of funds is, therefore, not the sole consideration for agents. The conversion of assets into money and the subsequent direction of that money must be observed.

As information changes, the United Nations publish lists of terrorist or terrorist organizations. Financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professionals are required to remain abreast of this information and check their databases against these lists. Should any

person or entity on the lists be clients, that information should be immediately communicated to the FIU.

The FATF Recommendations place obligations on countries as they relate to terrorist financing in the context of national cooperation and coordination, confiscation and provisional measures and targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing. The latter is applicable to all United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) applying targeted financial sanctions relating to the financing of terrorism.

Financing of Proliferation

The FATF defines proliferation financing as *“the act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations.”*

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can take many forms, but ultimately involves the transfer or export of technology, goods, software, services or expertise that can be used in programmes involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and their delivery systems (such as long range missiles).

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The Government of Guyana has enacted several pieces of legislation aimed at preventing and detecting drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorist financing and other serious crimes. The Acts which are most relevant for the purposes of this Guideline are as follows:

- a) The Anti Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act 2009
 - a. AMLCFT Amendment Act No. 15 of 2010
 - b. AMLCFT Amendment Act No. 1 of 2015
 - c. AMLCFT Amendment Act No. 10 of 2015
 - d. AMLCFT Amendment Act No. 15 of 2016
 - e. AMLCFT Amendment Act No. 21 of 2017
 - f. AMLCFT Amendment Act No. 17 of 2018
 - g. AMLCFT Amendment Act No. 12 of 2022
 - h. AMLCFT Amendment Act 2023
 - i. AMLCFT Regulation No. 4 of 2010
 - j. AMLCFT Regulation No. 4 of 2015
 - k. AMLCFT Regulation No. 7 of 2015
- b) Real Estate Agents and Brokers Act 2023

- c) Anti-Terrorism and Terrorist Related Activities Act No. 15 of 2015
- d) The Guyana Compliance Commission Act 2023
- e) Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act
- f) Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act No. 38 of 2009
- g) Criminal Law (Offences) Act No. 18 of 1893 as amended

The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) established under *Section 9 of the AML/CFT Act 2009* as amended, plays a central role in Guyana's AML/CFT operational network and provides support to the work of supervisory authorities and competent authorities.

The core functions of the FIU are outlined under *Section 9(4) of the AMLCFT Act 2009* as amended. Central to these functions, is the FIU's primary responsibility to request, receive, analyze and disseminate information in the form of intelligence reports based on suspicious transactions and other information submitted by reporting entities and other competent authorities.

The FIU's core function is supported by the cooperation and collaboration with reporting entities, supervisory authorities, and other competent authorities such as the Special Organised Crime Unit (SOCU), Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA), the Land, Deeds and Commercial Registries, to gather intelligence within the AML/CFT framework and analyze and disseminate information as may be necessary to fulfill its overall mandate under the AMLCFT Act.

Other functions of the FIU include:

- Maintaining statistics and records;
- Issuing guidelines to reporting entities;
- Providing advice to the Minister of Finance on matters relating to ML or TF that affect public policy or national security;
- Conducting of research into trends and developments to improve ways of detecting, preventing and deterring money laundering and terrorist financing;
- Creating training requirements and providing training for reporting entities on identification, record keeping and reporting obligations under AMLCFT Act;
- Conducting investigations into money laundering, proceeds of crime and terrorist financing (for official purposes only); and
- Extending legal assistance to foreign jurisdiction with respect to production orders, property tracking, monitoring, forfeiture or confiscation orders.

Where a real estate agent is uncertain about how to treat an unusual or suspicious transaction, the real estate agent is strongly urged to speak directly to the FIU for preliminary guidance and then make a report as appropriate.

Suspicious Transaction Forms and Terrorist Property Reporting Forms may be accessed on the FIU's website: <https://fiu.gov.gy/essential-forms/>

Where a real estate agent is uncertain about how to treat an unusual or suspicious transaction, the real estate agent is urged to speak directly to the FIU for preliminary guidance and then make a report as appropriate.

GATEKEEPERS

Gate keepers are businesses or professionals that are able to provide access into the financial system, including real estate agents. They have the ability to allow illicit funds into the financial system, whether knowingly or not. This informs why it is necessary to regulate their activities for anti-money laundering purposes, although they are not financial institutions.

The Role of the Real Estate Agent

The real-estate sector is of extraordinary importance to the economy in general and the financial system in particular. It offers advantages both for law-abiding citizens and for those who would misuse the sector for criminal purposes. The economic development and growth of tourism in many countries have also led to exponential growth in the number of financial transactions linked to real-estate.

The extraordinary range of possibilities for misusing these processes allows suspected criminals to integrate and enjoy illegally obtained funds. Real estate transactions can involve large monetary transactions and due to the international nature of the real-estate market, it is often extremely difficult to identify real estate transactions associated with money laundering or terrorist financing.

All real estate businesses must therefore see AML/CFT as part of their overall risk management strategy. Money laundering and terrorist financing expose a real estate business to significant risks.

Whilst the role of agents varies from country to country, the core functions may include:

- Traditional exclusive (and non-exclusive) seller representation.
- Traditional exclusive (and non-exclusive) buyer representation.
- Representation of both buyer and seller in the same transaction.
- A number of agents representing sellers or buyers.

- National and transnational referrals.
- Amalgamation or interaction of functions of other professionals, *e.g.* notaries, lawyers, lenders, valuers.
- Auctions.

Real estate agents may assume additional functions relative to transactions, such as mortgage loan assessment, valuation/appraisal and conveyance of property. The risk associated with these functions should be considered with reference to specific applicable legislation/guidance.

Real estate agents may benefit from the fact that most transactions in which they may engage involve a regulated entity like a bank or a credit union which are subject to the supervision of a national regulator. However, where there are unusual features, additional precautionary steps must be taken. The required action would depend on the nature of the risk presented.

The best ally of a real estate professional is a thorough knowledge of how real estate transactions normally progress. This enables one to identify variations in the process and potential red flags. This helps in understanding how real estate transactions may be used in money laundering or terrorist financing schemes.

Competencies

It is responsibility of real estate agents to have certain basic competencies:

- The ability to identify potential money laundering activity
- Know what steps to take to mitigate the potential risk
- Know where to go for help in the event that there is a potential threat; and
- Appreciation of the commonality between money laundering and terrorist financing strategies and that funds directed towards terrorist activities often come from clean sources

Even though individual real estate agents may be able to conclude that specific AML/CFT obligations do not apply to them, ethical standards require them to ensure that their services are not being misused, including by criminals, and they should carefully consider what they need to do to mitigate that risk.

RISK-BASED APPROACH (RBA)

The AMLCT Act provides for the application of a risk-based approach to combatting ML/TF/PF. The RBA to AMLCFT means that countries, competent authorities and DNFBPs should identify, assess and understand the ML/TF risks to which they are exposed and take the required AML/CFT measures effectively and efficiently, to mitigate and manage the risks.

Key Elements of a RBA can be summarized as follows:

- (i) **Risk Identification and Assessment** - *identifying ML/TF risks facing a firm, given its customers, services, countries of operation, also having regard to publicly available information regarding ML/TF risks and typologies*
- (ii) **Risk Management and Mitigation** - *identifying and applying measures to effectively and efficiently mitigate and manage ML/TF risks*
- (iii) **Ongoing Monitoring** - *putting in place policies, procedures and information systems to monitor changes to ML/TF risks*
- (iv) **Documentation** - *documenting risk assessments, strategies, policies and procedures to monitor, manage and mitigate ML/TF risks*

The general principle of a RBA is that where there are higher risks, enhanced measures should be taken to manage and mitigate those risks. The range, degree, frequency or intensity of preventive measures and controls conducted should be stronger in higher risk scenarios. However, where the ML/TF risk is assessed as lower, the degree, frequency and/or the intensity of the controls conducted will be relatively lighter. Where risk is assessed at a normal level, the standard AML/CFT controls should apply. As general guidance, the following considerations should be at the base of all due diligence actions:

1. The nature and scale of the business;
2. The complexity, volume and size of transactions;
3. Type of customer (e.g. whether ownership is highly complex, whether the customer is a PEP, whether the customer's employment income supports account activity, whether customer is known to related business entities);
4. Delivery channels (e.g. whether internet banking, wire transfers to third parties, remote cash transactions);
5. Geographical area (e.g. whether business is conducted in or through jurisdictions with high levels of drug trafficking or corruption, whether the customer is subject to regulatory or public disclosure requirements); and
6. Value of business and frequency of transactions.

For real estate agents identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risk faced by the sector as well as specific to their services, client base, the jurisdictions where they operate, and the effectiveness of their controls in place, will require the investment of resources and training.

TYPES OF RISK

Real estate agents may assess ML/TF risks by applying various categories. This provides a strategy for managing potential risks by enabling real estate agents, where required, to subject each client to reasonable and proportionate risk assessment. During the course of a client relationship, procedures for ongoing monitoring and review of the client/transactional risk

profile are also important. Real estate agents may also refer to FATF Guidance on indicators and risk factors;

The most commonly-used risk categories are:

- a) country or geographic risk;
- b) client risk; and
- c) risk associated with the particular service offered (Transaction Risk).

Country or Geographic Risk

It is expected that real estate agents will see transactions with a foreign component, as Guyana real estate is an attractive asset for persons from many parts of the world.

There is no universally agreed definition by competent authorities that prescribes whether a particular country or geographic area represents a higher risk. Country risk, in conjunction with other risk factors, provides useful information on ML/TF risks. Geographic risks of ML/TF may arise in a variety of circumstances, including from the domicile of the client, the location of the transaction or the source of wealth or the funds.

Jurisdictions with certain characteristics pose risks. Jurisdictions with AML/CFT regimes that fall below acceptable standards may be regarded as high risk. Jurisdictions which support terrorist activities or are known for significant political corruption are also high risk.

Real estate agents should be wary of doing business with persons from countries where, for example, it is believed that there is a high level of drug trafficking or corruption and greater care may be needed in establishing and maintaining the relationship or accepting business from such countries. Real estate agents should observe the Public Statements issued by the FATF and CFATF as it relates to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, from listed countries and to observe the list of countries published by any competent authority which lists countries that are non-compliant or do not sufficiently comply with FATF recommendations.

Real estate agents should therefore have regard to where a transaction or request for their services originated, but also whether a high-risk jurisdiction is an intermediate stage in the financing or ownership arrangement

Customer Risk

Determining the potential ML/TF risks posed by a client or category of clients is critical to the development and implementation of an overall risk-based framework. Based on their own

criteria, real estate firms and agents should seek to determine whether a particular client poses a higher risk and the potential impact of any mitigating factors on that assessment. Application of risk variables may mitigate or exacerbate the risk assessment.

There are several issues that may point to a risky customer:

- unusual involvement of third parties
- Titling a residential property in the name of third party; for example, a friend, relative, business associate, or lawyer.
- Industries or sectors where opportunities for ML/TF are particularly prevalent.
- PEPs and/or their family members and close associates.
- Entities that operate a considerable part of their business in or have major subsidiaries in countries that may pose higher geographic risk.
- Cash intensive businesses including money transfer services, casinos and other gaming institutions, dealers in precious metals and non-profit or charitable organizations, where such clients are themselves subject to and regulated for a full range of AML/CFT requirements consistent with the FATF Recommendations, this will aid to mitigate the risks.
- Reluctance to provide relevant information or the real estate agent having reasonable grounds to suspect that the information provided is incorrect or insufficient.

Transaction Risk

When determining the risk associated with the provision of services related to specified activities, consideration and appropriate weight should be given to transaction risks including:

- Under or over-valued properties. For example, is the property owner selling the property for significantly less than the purchase price? Does the seller seem disinterested in obtaining a better price?
- Use of large amounts of cash. Buyer brings actual cash to the closing. The purchase of a property without a mortgage, where it does not match the characteristics of the buyer. While rules and regulations governing the financial sector are designed to detect situations where large amounts of cash are being introduced, real estate agents should keep this factor in mind when evaluating whether a transaction seems suspicious. Property purchases inconsistent with the individual's occupation or income. Is the property being purchased significantly beyond the purchaser's means?

- Immediate resale of the property. Especially if the sale entails a significant increase or decrease in the price compared to the prior purchase price, without a reasonable explanation.
- Speed of transaction (without reasonable explanation).
- Unusual source of funding. Example: use of third-party funds to purchase a property where it doesn't make sense, i.e. third-party is not a parent, sibling, etc., use several different sources of funds without logical explanation, funding coming from a business but property not being held in business' name, or purchase of property doesn't match the business' purpose.
- Purchases being made without viewing the property, no interest in the characteristics of the property.
- Any other activities which demonstrate suspicious behavior and do not make professional or commercial sense based on the agent's familiarity with the real estate industry and the normal course of business.

Mitigating Risk

Real estate agents should implement appropriate measures and controls to mitigate the potential ML/TF risks for those clients that, as the result of a RBA, are determined to be higher risk. These measures should be tailored to the specific risk faced, both to ensure the risk is adequately addressed. Paramount among these measures is the requirement for real estate companies and appropriate staff to be adequately trained to identify and detect relevant changes in client activity by reference to risk-based criteria.

The presence of a single risk factor, or even multiple risk factors, does not necessarily mean the purchaser or seller is engaging in money laundering or financing terrorism and proliferation activities. The role of real estate agents is to be familiar with these risk factors and exercise sound judgment based on their knowledge of the real estate industry, and when a combination of these factors truly raises a red flag, know the proper action to take.

Real estate professionals should develop a sound risk management policy that they will follow in all transactions. This policy should document what customer information is required to facilitate a transaction. It should also set out in what circumstances business should be declined.

KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER /CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE

The process by which the real estate agent forms a reasonable belief that he/she knows the true identity customer and is then able to assess AML/CFT risk, is commonly referred to as know-your-customer or customer due diligence (CDD).

CDD measures should allow real estate agents to establish with reasonable certainty the true identity of each client. Due diligence procedures are a critical component of the role real estate professionals can play in helping to identify and combat money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing. Knowing an agent's true customer and understanding their interest and planned use for a property will help agents evaluate a situation where one or more red flags are raised.

In effecting the due diligence process, real estate professionals should:

- (i) Whenever possible, require prospective customers to be interviewed in person.
- (ii) In verifying customer identity, use independent official or other reliable source documents, data or information to verify the identity of the beneficial owner prior to establishing the business relationship. Identification documents which do not bear a photograph or signature and which are easily obtainable (e.g. birth certificate) are not acceptable as the sole means of identification. Customer identity may be verified using a combination of methods such as those listed at **Appendix 2**.
- (iii) In instances where original documents are not available, only accept copies that are certified by an approved person. Approved Persons should print their name clearly, indicate their position or capacity together with a contact address and phone number.
- (iv) If the documents are unfamiliar, take additional measures to verify that they are genuine eg. Contacting the relevant authorities; and
- (v) Determine through a risk analysis of the type of applicant and the expected size and activity of the account, the extent and nature of the information required to establish a relationship. Examples of documentation for different types of customers are set out in **Appendix 3**.

There is no basis for a real estate agent to accept or be the conduit for funds in a transaction. If there is a variation in this practice for any reason, the reason for this should be documented. Any unusual activity should be reported to the FIU.

Real estate agents are required to regularly review their AML/CFT systems and test them for effectiveness. Records should be reviewed to ensure that all existing customer records are current and valid.

Wherever beneficial ownership information is required, it must be borne in mind that the true beneficial owner is the ultimate beneficial owner. The ultimate beneficial owner is the natural person who controls or benefits from the assets of the business.

In cases where red flags are present, the agent should apply increased levels of CDD, which could include the following:

- 1) Obtain additional information, a driver's license, passport or other reliable identification document, to confirm the true identity of the customer.
- 2) If a legal entity is involved, such as a corporation, take additional measures to identify who actually controls or owns the entity and take risk based measures to verify the identity of the owner. This is commonly referred to as beneficial ownership information.
- 3) Obtain other appropriate information based on the agent's experience and knowledge to understand the customer's circumstances and business.

In addition, depending on the size of the firm, it may be appropriate for the agent to notify and discuss with senior management the higher risk customer or a particular situation that raises red flags, and to monitor the relationship if there are a series of transactions with the customer. However, two things should be borne in mind:

1. The legislation places the responsibility for anti-money laundering actions on the real estate agent, regardless of the business structure under which he/she operates, and
2. Most real estate transactions are likely to be one-off business arrangements.

Personal Customer

A real estate agent should obtain relevant information on the identity of his/her customer and seek to verify some of the information on a risk basis, through the use of reliable, independent source documents, data or information to prove to his/her satisfaction that the individual is who that individual claims to be. *See Section 15 of the AMLCFT Act as amended.*

The Basic information should include:

- True name and permanent residential address;
- Valid photo-bearing identification, with unique identifier, (e.g. passport, national identification card, driver's licence);
- Date and place of birth and nationality (if dual, should be indicated);
- Occupation and business or principal activity;
- Contact details e.g. telephone number, fax number and e-mail address;
- Purpose of the business; and
- Signature

The real estate entity should determine the degree of verification to be undertaken on a risk basis. In some instances, verification may be satisfied by maintaining current photo-bearing identification with a unique identifier (e.g. passport, national identification card).

Unavailability of Identity Documents

There may be circumstances where some types of customers are unable to supply the identity documents. Such customers include the elderly, the disabled and individuals dependent on the care of others. Agents may determine what alternate identity documentation to accept and verification to employ pursuant to relevant legislation.

Corporate Customer

To satisfy itself as to the identity of the customer, the real estate entity should obtain:

- a) Name of corporate entity;
- b) Principal place of business and registered office;
- c) Mailing address;
- d) Contact telephone and fax numbers;
- e)
- f) Identity information on the beneficial owners of the entity. This information should extend to identifying those who ultimately own and control the company and should include anyone who is giving instructions to the agent to act on behalf of the company. However,
 - i. If the company is publicly listed on a recognised stock exchange and not subject to effective control by a small group of individuals, identification on shareholders is not required;
 - ii. If the company is a private company, identity should be sought on persons with a minimum of 25% shareholding.
- g) Identity information on directors and officers who exercise effective control over the business and are in a position to override internal procedures / control mechanisms;
- h) Description and nature of business;
- i) Certified copy of the certificate of incorporation, organization, registration or continuance, as the case may be, or any other certificate that is evidence of the creation, registration or continuance of the body corporate, society or other legal person as such, officially authenticated where the body corporate, society or other legal person was created in another country;
- j) By-laws and other relevant documents, and any amendments thereto, filed with the Deeds and Commercial Registry , the Registrar of Friendly Societies, as the case may be
- k) Board resolution authorizing the business activity and conferring authority on signatories to the transaction; and
- l) Recent financial information or audited statements

In addition, the real estate agent may obtain any other information deemed appropriate. For example, one may also request the financial statements of parent or affiliate companies or seek evidence that the entity is not in the process of being dissolved or wound up. It should request this information, particularly for non-resident companies, where the corporate customer has no known track record, or it relies on established affiliates for funding.

Partnership/Unincorporated Business

Partnerships and unincorporated businesses should meet the relevant requirements set out in **'Role of the Real Estate Agent'** above. Each partner as well as immediate family members with ownership control should be identified. In addition to providing the identification documentation for partners/controllers and authorized signatories, where a formal partnership arrangement exists, the real estate entity may obtain a mandate from the partnership authorizing the business to be undertaken.

Trusts

Trust business is usually regarded as inherently risky because of the confidentiality associated with these entities. To satisfy itself as to the identity of the client, the real estate agent should obtain:

- a. Name of trust;
- b. Nature / type of trust;
- c. Country of establishment;
- d. Identity of the trustee(s), settlor(s), protector(s)/controller(s) or similar person holding power to appoint or remove the trustee and where possible the names or classes of beneficiaries;
- e. Identity of person(s) with powers to add beneficiaries, where applicable;
- f. Identity of the person providing the funds, if not the ultimate settler;
- g. Verify beneficiaries before the first distribution of assets;
- h. Verify protectors/controllers at the earlier of the first instance of exercise of power conferred by the trust instrument or the issue of instruction to an advisor to provide advice;
- i. Ongoing due diligence should be applied in the context of changes in any of the parties to the trust, revision of the trust, addition of funds, investment of trust funds or distribution of trust assets/provision of benefits out of trust assets.
- j. Verify the identity of the trust by obtaining a copy of the creating instrument and other amending or supplementing instruments

Professional Service Providers

Professional Service Providers act as intermediaries between clients and the real estate agents and they include lawyers, accountants and other third parties that act as financial liaisons for their clients. When establishing and maintaining relationships with professional service providers, a real estate agent should:

- (i) Adequately assess any risk and monitor the relationship for suspicious or unusual activity;
- (ii) Understand the intended business, including the anticipated transaction volume, and geographic locations involved in the relationship; and
- (iii) Obtain the identity of the beneficial owners of the client funds where it is not satisfied that the intermediary has in place due diligence procedures equivalent to the standard of this Guideline.

Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)

Concerns about the abuse of power by public officials for their own enrichment and the associated reputation and legal risks which real estate agents who deal with them may face have led to calls for enhanced due diligence on such persons. The FATF categorises PEPs as foreign, domestic, or a person who is or has been entrusted with the prominent function by an international organization. These categories of PEPs are defined as follows:

- Foreign PEPs: individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions by a foreign country, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials.
- Domestic PEPs: individuals who are or have been entrusted domestically with prominent public functions, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials.
- International organization PEPs: persons who are or have been entrusted with a prominent function by an international organization, refers to members of senior management or individuals who have been entrusted with equivalent functions, i.e. directors, deputy directors and members of the board or equivalent functions.
- Family members are individuals who are related to a PEP either directly (consanguinity) or through marriage or similar (civil) forms of partnership.
- Close associates are individuals who are closely connected to a PEP, either socially or professionally

Real estate agents should, in relation to foreign PEPs (whether as a customer or beneficial owner), in addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures:

- a) Have appropriate risk-management systems to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner is a politically exposed person;
- b) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds; and
- c) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.

With respect to domestic PEPs or persons who are or have been entrusted with a prominent public function by an international organization, in addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures, real estate agents should:

- a) Take reasonable measures to determine whether a customer or the beneficial owner is such a person; and
- b) In cases of a higher risk business relationship with such persons, apply the measures referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) above.

However, a domestic PEP is subject to the foreign PEPs requirements if that individual is also a foreign PEP through another prominent public function in another country. The requirements for all types of PEP should also apply to family members or close associates of such PEPs.

Reduced Customer Due Diligence

A real estate agent may apply reduced due diligence to a customer provided he satisfies himself that the customer is of such a risk level that qualifies for this treatment. Such circumstances are set out below:

- a) An entity licensed under the Financial Institutions Act
- b) An entity registered under the Securities Industry Act
- c) An entity licensed under the Cooperative Societies Act, Friendly Societies Act or New Building Societies Act
- d) The Government of Guyana
- e) A statutory body

If based on risk, it is thought necessary to apply reduced due diligence in circumstances other than those listed above, senior management should consider and approve this decision. This process should be recorded.

RECORD KEEPING

Section 16 of the AMLCFT Act 2009 as amended requires that reporting entities maintain all records of its customer's transaction for at least seven (7) years from the date the relevant transaction was completed, or termination of business relationship, whichever is later.

However, it may be necessary to retain records, until such time as advised by the FIU or High Court, for a period exceeding the statutory period, beginning from the date of termination of the last business transaction, where:

- (i) There has been a report of suspicious activity; or
- (ii) There is an on-going investigation relating to a transaction or client.

Reporting entities must maintain, all records on transactions, both domestic and international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from competent authorities, e.g., FIU, the Special Organised Crime Unit (SOCU), Supervisory Authorities (SA).

Real Estate Agents should establish a document retention policy that provides for the maintenance of a broad spectrum of records, including customer identification data, business transaction records, internal and external reporting and training records.

Internal and External Records

Real Estate Agents should maintain records related to unusual and suspicious business transactions for no less than 7 years. These include:

- a. All reports made by staff to the Compliance Officer;
- b. The internal written findings of transactions investigated. This applies irrespective of whether a suspicious report was made;
- c. Consideration of those reports and of any action taken;
- d. Reports by the Compliance officer to senior management and board of directors;
- e. Reports to the Authority on positive screening results in relation to terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation; and
- f. Reports to the Authority on the total amount of frozen assets in relation to terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation.

Training Records

Real Estate agents are required to provide training and awareness programmes and to maintain an on-going training programme for themselves and all persons working in their businesses

In order to provide evidence of compliance with Section 19(d) of the AMLCFT Act 2009 as amended, at a minimum, the following information must be maintained:

- a) Details and contents of the training programme attended by practitioners and staff;
- b) Names of staff receiving the training;
- c) Dates that training sessions were attended or held; and
- d) Results of any testing included in the training programmes;
- e) An on-going training plan.

Maintenance of Records: A reporting entity must ensure that there is in place, an effective storage system that will facilitate the protection of documents. That is to prevent records from becoming, blurred, defaced, illegible, mutilated or in any other way deteriorated. Where records are being stored digitally or electronically, they must be easily retrievable or capable of reproduction in a printable and legible (readable) form.

Records Retrieval: Records must be retrieved promptly or without undue delay by the reporting entity. In other words, upon request for information by the FIU or other authorised authority, the reporting entity must ensure that the information is submitted (promptly) by the date specified by the requesting authority; or an order of the court.

COMPLIANCE FUNCTION

Real estate agents must establish procedures for ensuring compliance with legal requirements as set out in relevant legislation and this Guideline to demonstrate that they are able to identify suspicious activity.

A sole agent has the responsibility of personally carrying out all required due diligence activities, unless this function is contracted out. However, the agent remains responsible for the compliance function.

With respect to a corporate or other legal entity, a compliance officer at the level of management must be appointed. This is to ensure that this officer has access to all relevant internal information without having to seek clearance in each case. Where the compliance function is contracted out, the agent remains responsible for the function.

Internal Reporting Procedure

To facilitate the detection of suspicious transactions, a real estate agent should:

- (i) Require clients or customers to declare the source and/or purpose of funds where a transaction seems unusual to reasonably ascertain that funds are not the proceeds of criminal activity
- (ii) Develop written policies, procedures and processes to provide guidance on the reporting chain and the procedure to follow when identifying and researching unusual transactions and reporting suspicious activities;
- (iii) Identify suitably qualified and experienced person to whom unusual and suspicious reports are channelled. The person should have direct access to the appropriate records to determine the basis for reporting the matter to the Authority
- (iv) Require staff to document in writing their suspicion about a transaction; and
- (v) Require documentation of internal enquiries.

Persons who are not functioning as part of a firm or other business arrangement but instead are operating as sole agents, are expected to apply these steps to the extent that they are relevant.

External Reporting – Reporting Suspicious Activity

Agents are required by law to report forthwith to the FIU where the identity of the person involved, the transaction or any other circumstance concerning that transaction lead the agent to have reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction:

- i. Involves proceeds of crime to which the AMLCFT Act applies;
- ii. Involves the financing of terrorism; or
- iii. Is of a suspicious or an unusual nature.

Real estate agents are advised to monitor suspicious activity, but there is an obligation to report activity that satisfies the threshold for inconsistency with normal behaviour. After a reasonable time, a transaction, or series of transactions, should be cleared of suspicion, and if this cannot be done with a clear conscience, a report should be made to the FIU.

A Suspicious Transaction Report form should be completed and submitted to the FIU pursuant to the AMLCFT Act, for analysis. Once reported, nothing should be done to indicate to any person that such a report was made. There are legal consequences for tipping off a person that an investigation is about to commence or has commenced or that a report was made to the FIU. Bear in mind that tipping off may be inadvertent and could take place through the loose handling of information.

RED FLAGS

There are a myriad of ways in which money laundering or terrorism financing may occur. Below is a non-exhaustive list of “Red Flags” that may warrant closer attention.

Financial institutions are encouraged to refer to such organizations as the FATF, Egmont Group and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for typology reports and sanitised cases on money laundering and terrorist financing schemes, respectively.

IF THE CLIENT:

- Does not want correspondence sent to home address
- Shows uncommon curiosity about internal systems, controls and policies
- Over justifies or explains the transaction
- Is involved in activity out-of-keeping for that individual or business

IF THE CLIENT:

- Produces seemingly false identification or identification or information to be counterfeited, altered or inaccurate
- **Provides insufficient, false or suspicious information, or information that is difficult or expensive to verify**

ECONOMIC PURPOSE

- Transaction is unnecessarily complex for its stated purpose
- Activity is inconsistent with what would be expected from declared business
- Transaction involves non-profit or charitable organization for which there appears to be no logical economic purpose or where there appears to be no link between the stated activity of the organization and the other parties in the transaction.
- Accounts that show virtually no banking activity but are used to receive or pay significant amounts not clearly related to the customer or the customer’s business.

CASH TRANSACTIONS

- Client starts conducting frequent cash transactions in large amounts when this has not been a normal activity in the past
- Frequent exchanges small bills for large ones
- Deposits of small amounts of cash on different successive occasions, in such a way that on each occasion the amount is not significant, but combines to total a very large amount (ie. Smurfing)

- Consistently making cash transactions that are just under the reporting threshold amount in an apparent attempt to avoid the reporting threshold.
- Stated occupation is not in keeping with the level or type of activity (eg. Student or an unemployed individual makes daily maximum cash withdrawals at multiple locations over wide geographic area)
- Unusually large deposits or withdrawals of cash by an individual or legal entity whose apparent business activities are normally carried out using cheques and other monetary instruments.
- Multiple and frequent purchase or sale of foreign currency by a tourist
- Multiple and frequent large withdrawals from an ATM using a local debit card issued by another financial institution
- Multiple and frequent large withdrawals from an ATM using debit or credit card issued by a foreign financial institution

DEPOSIT ACTIVITY

- Account with a large number of small cash deposits and a small number of large cash withdrawals
- Funds are being deposited into several accounts, consolidated into one and transferred outside the country
- Multiple transactions are carried out on the same day at the same branch but with an apparent attempt to use different tellers
- Establishment of multiple accounts, some of which appear to remain dormant for extended periods.
- Account that was reactivated from inactive or dormant status suddenly exhibits significant activity
- Reactivated dormant account containing minimal sum suddenly receives a deposit or series of deposits are made to a client's account by third parties.
- Deposits or withdrawals of multiple monetary instruments, particularly if the instruments are sequentially numbered.

CROSS BORDER TRANSACTIONS

- Deposits followed within a short time by wire transfers to or through locations of concern such as countries known or suspected to facilitate money laundering activities.
- Transaction involves a country where illicit drug production or exporting may be prevalent, or where there is no effective anti-money laundering system
- Immediate conversions of funds transfers into monetary instruments in the name of third parties.
- Frequent sending and receiving of wire transfers, especially to or from countries considered high risk for money laundering or terrorist financing, or with strict secrecy

laws. Added attention should be paid if such operations occur through small or family run banks, shell banks or unknown banks.

- Large incoming or outgoing transfers with instructions for payment in cash
- Client makes frequent or large electronic funds transfers for person who have no account relationship with the institution.
- Client instructs you to transfer funds abroad and to expect an equal incoming transfer
- Client sends frequent wire transfers to foreign countries, but business does not seem to have connection to destination country
- Wire transfers are received from entities having no apparent business connection with client.

PERSONAL TRANSACTIONS

- Client has no employment history but make frequent large transactions or maintains a large account balance
- Client has numerous accounts and deposits cash into each of them with the total credits being a large amount
- Client frequently makes automatic banking machine deposits just below the reporting threshold.
- Increased use of safety deposit boxes. Increased activity by the person holding the boxes. The Depositing and withdrawal of sealed packages.
- Third parties make cash payments or deposit cheques to a client's credit card
- Client has frequent deposits identified as proceeds of asset sales but assets cannot be substantiated.

CORPORATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

- Accounts have a large volume of deposits in bank drafts, cashier's cheques, money orders or electronic funds transfers, which is inconsistent with the client's business.
- Accounts have deposits in combinations of cash and monetary instruments not normally associated with business activity
- Unexplained transactions are repeated between personal and business accounts.
- A large number of incoming and outgoing wire transfers take place for which there appears to be no logical business or other economic purpose, particularly when this is through or from locations of concern, such as countries known or suspected to facilitate money laundering activities.

LENDING

- Customer suddenly repays a problem loan unexpectedly, without indication of the origin of the funds
- Loans guaranteed by third parties with no apparent relation to the customer
- Loans backed by assets, for which the source is unknown or the value has no relation to the situation of the customer.
- Default on credit used for legal trading activities, or transfer of such credits to another company, entity or person, without any apparent justification, leaving the bank to enforce the guarantee backing the credit.
- Use of standby letters of credit to guarantee loans granted by foreign financial institutions, without any apparent economic justification.

SECURITIES

- Client frequently makes large investments in stocks, bonds, investments trusts or the like in cash or by cheque within a short time period, which is inconsistent with the normal practice of the client.
- Client makes large or unusual settlements of securities in cash.
- Client is willing to deposit or invest at rates that are not advantageous or competitive.

ACCOUNTS UNDER INVESTIGATION

- Accounts that are the source or receiver of significant funds related to an account or person under investigation or the subject of legal proceedings in a court or other competent national or foreign authority in connection with fraud, terrorist financing or money laundering.
- Accounts controlled by the signatory of another account that is under investigation or the subject of legal proceedings by a court or other competent national or foreign authority with fraud, terrorist financing or money laundering.

FIDUCIARY BUSINESS

- Client seeks to invest a large sum of money with no apparent interest in the details of the product and does not enquire about the characteristics of the product and or feigns market ignorance
- Corporate client opens account with large sum of money that is not in keeping with the operations of the company, which may itself have recently been formed.
- Formation of a legal person or increases to its capital in the form of non-monetary contributions of real estate, the value of which does not take into account the increase in market value of the properties used.

EMPLOYEES

- Lifestyle, financial status or investment activity is not in keeping with the employee's known income
- Reluctance to go on vacation, to change job position or to accept a promotion, with no clear and reasonable explanation.
- Employee frequently receives gifts/and or invitations from certain clients, with no clear or reasonable justification
- Employee hinders colleagues from dealing with specific client(s) with no apparent justification
- Employee documents or partially supports the information or transactions of a particular client with no clear and reasonable justification
- Employee frequently negotiates exceptions for a particular client(s).

TERRORIST FINANCING INDICATORS

The Egmont Group reviewed 22 terrorist financing cases submitted by financial intelligence units (FIUs) and compiled financial and behavioral indicators that were most frequently observed indicators associated to terrorist financing. Behaviour indicators include:

- The parties to the transaction (owner, beneficiary, etc.) being from countries known to support terrorist activities and organizations
- Use of false corporations, including shell companies
- Inclusion of the individual in the United Nations 1267 Sanctions list
- Media reports that the account holder is linked to known terrorist organization or is engaged in terrorist activities
- Beneficial owner of the account is not properly identified
- Use of nominees, trusts, family member or third-party accounts
- Use of false identification
- Abuse of nonprofit organizations Indicators linked to financial transactions
- The use of funds by nonprofit organization is not consistent with the purpose for which it was established
- The transaction is not economically justified considering the account holder's business or profession
- A series of complicated transfers of funds from one person to another as a means to hide the source and intended use of the funds
- Transactions that are inconsistent with the account's normal activity
- Deposits were structured below the reporting requirements to avoid detection
- Multiple cash deposits and withdrawals with suspicious references
- Frequent domestic and international ATM activity
- No business rationale or economic justifications for the transactions

- Unusual cash activity in foreign bank accounts
- Multiple cash deposits in small amounts in an account followed by a large wire transfer to another country
- Use of multiple foreign bank accounts

PROLIFERATION FINANCING INDICATORS

- When customer is involved in the supply, sale, delivery or purchase of dual-use, proliferation sensitive or military goods, particularly to higher risk jurisdictions.
- When customer or counter-party, or its address, is the same or similar to that of an individual or entity found on publicly available sanctions lists.
- The customer is a research body connected with a higher risk jurisdiction of proliferation concern.
- When customer's activities do not match with the business profile provided to the reporting entity.
- When customer is vague about the ultimate beneficiaries and provides incomplete information or is resistant when requested to provide additional information.
- When customer uses complicated structures to conceal connection of goods imported / exported, for example, uses layered letters of credit, front companies, intermediaries and brokers.
- When a freight forwarding / customs clearing firm being listed as the product's final destination in the trade documents.
- When final destination of goods to be imported / exported is unclear from the trade related documents provided to the reporting entity.
- Project financing and complex loans, where there is a presence of other objective factors such as an unidentified end-user.
- The transaction(s) involve an individual or entity in any country of proliferation concern.
- The transaction(s) related to dual-use, proliferation-sensitive or military goods, whether licensed or not.
- The transaction(s) involve the shipment of goods inconsistent with normal geographical trade patterns i.e. where the country involved does not normally export or import or usually consumed the types of goods concerned.
- Over / under invoice of dual-use, proliferation-sensitive or military goods, trade transactions.
- When goods destination/shipment country is different from the country, where proceeds are sent/ received without any plausible reason.

APPENDIX 2

VERIFICATION EXAMPLES

A. Personal Clients

- Confirm the date of birth from an official document (e.g. birth certificate).
- Confirm the permanent address (e.g. utility bill, tax assessment, bank statement, letter from a public notary).
- Contact the customer e.g. by telephone, letter, email to confirm information supplied
- Confirming the validity of the official documents provided through certification by an authorised person.
- Confirm the permanent and/ business residence through credit agencies, home visits
- Obtain personal references from third parties and existing customers in writing.
- Contact issuers of references.
- Confirmation of employment.

B. Corporate Customers & Partnerships

- Review of current audited information (preferably audited).
- Obtain statements of affairs, bank statements, confirmation of net worth from reputable financial advisers.
- Seek confirmation from a reputable service provider(s).
- Confirm that the company is in good standing.
- Undertake enquiries using public and private databases.
- Obtain prior banking and commercial references, in writing.
- Contact issuers of references.
- Onsite visitations.
- Contact the customer e.g. by telephone, letter, email to confirm information supplied.

C. Trusts and Fiduciary Clients

- Seek confirmation from a reputable service provider(s).
- Obtain prior bank references.
- Access public or private databases.

APPENDIX 3

CONFIRMATION OF CUSTOMER VERIFICATION OF IDENTITY

Part A - Personal Customers

Full Name of Customer: (Mr/Mrs/Ms)

.....

Known Aliases:.....

Identification:.....

Current Permanent Address:.....

Date of Birth:..... Nationality:.....

Country of Residence:.....

Specimen Customer Signature Attached: **Yes** ___ **No**__

Part B - Corporate & Other Customers

Full Name of Customer:.....

Type of Entity:

Location & domicile of Business:

Country of Incorporation:

Regulator / Registrar:

Names of Directors:

.....

Names of majority beneficial owners:.....

.....

Part C

We confirm that the customer is known to us. **Yes** ___ **No** ___

We confirm that the identity information is held by us. **Yes** ___ **No** ___

We confirm that the verification of the information meets - the requirements of Guyana law and AML/CFT/CPF Guideline. **Yes** ___ **No** ___

We confirm that the applicant is acting on his own behalf and - not as a nominee, trustee or in a fiduciary capacity for any - other person. **Yes** ___ **No** ___ **N/A** ___

Part D

Customer Group Name:

Relation with Customer:

Part E

Name & Position of Preparing Officer:

(Block Letters)

Signature & Date:.....

Name & Position of Authorising Officer:.....

(Block Letters)

Signature & Date:.....