

Financial Intelligence Unit Circular

Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – October 24, 2025

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘Grey List’

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are jurisdictions that are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing and have committed to resolve swiftly, the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes.

Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and are under increased monitoring are as follows:

<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Monaco</i>
<i>Angola</i>	<i>Namibia</i>
<i>Bulgaria</i>	<i>Nepal</i>
<i>Bolivia</i>	<i>South Sudan</i>
<i>Cameroon</i>	<i>Syria</i>
<i>Cote D’Ivoire</i>	<i>Venezuela</i>
<i>Democratic Republic of Congo</i>	<i>Vietnam</i>
<i>Haiti</i>	<i>Virgin Islands (UK)</i>
<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Yemen</i>
<i>Lao PDR</i>	
<i>Lebanon</i>	

The FATF continues to provide some flexibility to jurisdiction not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since June 2025:

<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>South Africa</i>
<i>Angola</i>	<i>Lao PDR</i>	<i>South Sudan</i>

No. 6

October 24, 2025

<i>Bulgaria</i>	<i>Monaco</i>	<i>Syria</i>
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	<i>Mozambique</i>	<i>Venezuela</i>
<i>Cameroon</i>	<i>Namibia</i>	<i>Vietnam</i>
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	<i>Nepal</i>	
<i>Democratic Republic of Congo</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	

The following jurisdictions chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued previously for these jurisdictions remain the same, but they may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions' AML/CFT regimes.

<i>Bolivia</i>
<i>Haiti</i>
<i>Lebanon</i>
<i>The Virgin Islands (UK)</i>
<i>Yemen</i>

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies listed above as they report on the progress made in addressing their strategic deficiencies.

The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. FATF will continue to closely monitor their progress.

While the FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions, the FATF calls for the application of a risk-based approach and encourages its members and all jurisdictions to consider the information presented in the full statement “*Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring –October 24, 2025*” in their risk analysis.

Jurisdictions no longer subject to increased monitoring by FATF:

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso

The FATF welcomes Burkina Faso's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Burkina Faso strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2021, by: (1) adopting follow-up mechanisms for monitoring actions in the national strategy; (2) seeking MLA and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) strengthening resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (4) maintaining comprehensive and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) increasing the diversity of suspicious transactions reporting; (6) enhancing the FIU's human resources through additional hiring, training and budget; (7) conduct training for LEAs, prosecutors and other relevant authorities; (8) demonstrating that authorities are pursuing confiscation as a policy objective; (9) enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in combatting TF, in line with the National TF Strategy; and (10) implementing effective targeted financial sanctions regimes related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs. Burkina Faso should continue to work with GIABA to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

Mozambique

Mozambique

The FATF welcomes Mozambique's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Mozambique strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in October 2022, by: (1) ensuring cooperation and coordination amongst relevant authorities to implement risk-based AML/CFT strategies and policies; (2) conducting training for all LEAs on mutual legal assistance to enhance the gathering of evidence or seizure/confiscation of proceeds of crime; (3) providing adequate financial and human resources to supervisors, developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (4) providing adequate resources to the authorities to commence the collection of adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information of legal persons; (5) increasing the human resources of the FIU as well as increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities; (6) demonstrating LEAs capability to effectively investigate ML/TF cases using financial intelligence; (7) conducting a comprehensive TF Risk Assessment and begin implementing a comprehensive national CFT strategy; (8) increasing awareness on TF and PF-related TFS; and (9) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan.

Mozambique should continue to work with ESAAMLG to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

No. 6
October 24, 2025
Nigeria

Nigeria

The FATF welcomes Nigeria's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Nigeria strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2023, by: (1) completing its residual ML/TF risk assessment and updating its national AML/CFT strategy to ensure alignment with other national strategies relevant to high-risk predicate offences; (2) enhancing formal and informal international cooperation in line with its ML/TF risks; (3) improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; (4) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date BO information on legal persons and applying sanctions for breaches of BO obligations; (5) demonstrating an increase in the dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU and its use by LEAs; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with ML risks; (7) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and apply appropriate sanctions and maintaining comprehensive data on frozen, seized, confiscated, and disposed assets; (8) demonstrating sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of different types of TF activities in line with risk and enhancing interagency cooperation on TF investigations; and (9) conducting risk-based and targeted outreach to NPOs at risk of TF abuse and implementing risk-based monitoring for the subset of NPOs at risk of TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.


Nigeria should continue to work with GIABA to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

South Africa

The FATF welcomes South Africa's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. South Africa strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2023, by: (1) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound MLA requests that help facilitate ML/TF investigations and confiscations of different types of assets in line with its risk profile; (2) improving risk-based supervision of DNFBPs and demonstrating that all AML/CFT supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective sanctions for noncompliance; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to BO obligations; (4) demonstrating a sustained increase in law enforcement agencies' requests for financial intelligence from the FIC for its ML/TF investigations; (5) demonstrating a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile; (6) enhancing its identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of a wider range of predicate crimes, in line with its risk profile; (7) updating its TF Risk Assessment to inform the implementation of a comprehensive national counter financing of terrorism strategy; and (8) ensuring the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions and demonstrating an effective mechanism to identify individuals and entities that meet the criteria for domestic designation.

South Africa should continue to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

No. 6
October 24, 2025



The FATF encourages these countries to continue to work with the CFATF, relevant FATF Styled Regional bodies and FATF to further improve their AMLCFT systems.

Please refer to the FATF's publication of October 24, 2025 at <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2025.html> for the updated and complete statements on these jurisdictions.

Reporting entities should take the FATF statements into account when considering whether a particular transaction should be reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as a suspicious transaction under Section 18(4) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLCFT) Act of 2009. Where a transaction is reportable under Regulation 12 of Regulations 2010 made under the AMLCFT Act as a threshold transaction, reporting entities should remember that a suspicious transaction report may be required in addition to the threshold report, where suspicion or reasonable grounds for suspicion exist, and that the funds, transaction or attempted transaction are linked or related to money laundering or terrorist financing offences, or the funds are linked to or is to be used for terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations.

Note:

The information contained in this document is intended only to provide a summary and general overview on these matters. It is not intended to be comprehensive. It does not constitute, nor should it be treated as legal advice or opinions.